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Can Non-Oil Incomes Outride Oil Incomes in Nigeria? Evidence from Autoregressive 






The study employed data from 1970 to 2014 to forecast government non-oil revenues and non-
oil exports in Nigeria in an attempt to know the number of years it would take non-oil incomes to 
outpace the income from oil sources using Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) 
Model. The results show that non-oil revenue of government will match the size of 2014 
government oil revenue in 2023 (9 years), while it would take 466 years for non-oil exports to 
achieve the oil exports equivalence. However, it would take non-oil revenues and non-oil exports 
14 years and 565 years respectively to achieve the 2011 historic highest oil incomes (oil 
revenues and oil exports) of 8,878.97 Billion Naira and 14,323.20 Billion Naira. Meanwhile, if 
non-oil revenue increases annually by 15 percent, using 2014 as base year, the target could be 
achieved in 2025 (11 years), but it would take non-oil exports annual increase of 18 percent to hit 
the target in 2030 (26 years). It is thus suggested that, while the current government revenue 
mobilization and strategies be maintained, the government efforts on export promotions vis-à-vis 
non-oil diversifications must be more than doubled in order to upturn the oil dependent Nigerian 
economy to non-oil economic base before the year 2050.   
 












                                                             









Nigeria is plagued with natural resource curse (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006; Ross 1999) 
basically for its inability to translate the huge resources accrued to the economy through oil 
exploration over the last four decades to a sustainable development of all and sundry. Skepticism 
trails all attempt to sympathise with the country on its current economic recess, which is 
motivated by the dwindling crude oil revenues vis-à-vis global oil price crash. This is due to the 
fact that it has misused huge opportunities of its enormous oil proceedings. However, it is 
interesting to discover that while resource course is generally attributed to Dutch diseases in oil 
rich countries, the Nigeria case is much different. Its resource curse is motivated by waste and 
corruption, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2008). The whole drama in the country could be 
summarized in a simple statement that ‘only what is earned through hard work is well managed’. 
If the country put up half of the commitment dissipated over the past one year of economic 
recession, on the economic management of the past four decades, probably the country would be 
a proud member of the richest and highly developed countries of the world. It could be 
concluded that, the reality of recession is fueling the passion of the nation towards anti-
corruption crusade and commitment to diversify the economy by providing alternatives to crude 
oil revenues and exports. 
 
Nigeria has been identified as the world most oil dependent country in 2000 for receiving 99.6 
percent of its export income from oil, Ross (2003). The World Bank in its 1999 report estimated 
Nigeria total earning from oil at about $300 billion over the preceding 25 years, and also 
received the equivalent amount in the next 12 years till 2011 through various oil and gas related 
activities. Some other estimates argued for $1 trillion total earnings in current dollars over the 
thirty-seven years. Nigeria astronomical increase in crude oil production enlist it among the 
sixteen largest world oil producers and eighth largest exporter. Most of the world largest 
producers ahead of Nigeria are not major crude oil exporters. Russia, USA, China, Canada and 
Norway produce more oil than Nigeria, but refine, process into gasoline and other 
petrochemicals for their domestic use and exports. Oil shocks have little effects on those 
economy for their logical avoidance of laying foundation on products whose prices are 
exogenously determined and volatile. Technically, their economies are shield through 
transformation of the inherent oil volatility, such that the prices of the new derived products 
could be determined within the domestic economies.  In case of Nigeria, the huge deposit of gas 
and crude oil, estimated at about 184 trillion cubic feet (5th largest gas reserve in the world) and 
40 billion barrels respectively is a major illusion leading the country to abandon other sources of 
income, and more importantly lavish the proceeds through corruption and over dependent on the 
importation of finished products, including the refined or processed oil. Ideally, the natural 
blessings of the crude oil could have been utilized to speed up the economic development of the 
country through appropriate investments into the future vis-à-vis massive infrastructure, quality 
education and commitment to general wellbeing of the populace. More importantly, to have 
utilized the huge returns to diversify the economy into other sectors where the country holds 
comparative advantage over other countries. 
 
It is important to underscore that Nigeria did not start out as the oil dependent economy. In the 
post independent, non-oil export dominated the sources of foreign exchange to the country, 
accounting for about 97.4% as against 2.6% oil export in 1960.  As presented in fig. 1, it lost out 
to oil revenues as the exploration increases over the years. Meanwhile, the abandonment of other 
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sectors especially the agricultural sector which provided almost all the non-oil revenues in the 
60s had worsen the case. However, despite the marginalization, the high potential characterizing 
the sector still remains and appears to be the cornerstone for economic resuscitation in the face of 
current recession and economic downturn. Government’s ability to realize this potentials and 
work, as it does currently, to revitalize it and reposition it is fundamental to the country’s reality 
of coming out of the trap of the crude oil shocks. To achieve this, government is promoting an 
increased production in the non-oil sector by creating a level-playing field for private-sector led 
activities, especially in the areas of agricultural productions and value chains to ensure adequate 
import substitutions for foreign imported products and prepare the country beyond exportation of 
raw agricultural products. It is believed that processing of raw farm outputs to semi-finished and 
finished products appears more stable to generate foreign exchange in a less volatile 
circumstances than a mere exportation of raw outputs. It is however worth of note that till date 
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Fig 1: Trends of Oil and Non-Oil Exports (% of Total Exports)  
Nigeria is the largest producer of cassava, cowpeas, kola nuts, yam and sorghum and is the 
second largest producer of cashew after Vietnam and second largest producer of millet and okra 
after India. More also, it is the third largest producer of palm oil after India and Malaysia and 
also the third largest producer of palm kernel after Indonesia and Malaysia. As it stands, the 
country is the fourth largest producer of cocoa beans after Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia and Ghana 
and also the fourth largest producer of Ginger after India, China Mainland and Nepal, equally the 
fourth largest producer of groundnut after China Mainland, India and United States of America 
to mention but few products in which it holds leading world records. These outstanding 
performances in the key areas provide convincing premises to support a hope for realistic 
economic diversification into non-oil sources of income to the country. The potential is also 
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obvious in fig. 2, showing hundred percent government revenues through non-oil as against zero 
percent oil revenue in the first eight years of post-independent in 1960s, but shortly after the 
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Fig 2: Trend of Oil and Non-Oil Revenue (% of Total Revenues)  
Meanwhile, considering the potentials of non-oil sectors and positive disposition of government 
to economic diversifications, two key issues are fundamental to the reality of redeeming the 
economy from the current oil price shocks. First, the government commitments towards 
diversifications to non-oil activities as major sources of foreign incomes to cover up for the 
shortage of oil income is a long-run reality. Obviously, this questions the short-run possibilities 
of recovering from the economic recession. Secondly, how long will it take other sources of 
government revenues, such as boosting non-oil taxes within the economy and incomes from non-
oil exports to augment the dwindled revenues from oil sources to meet up with the budgetary 
needs of the government in the short and medium term?  
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Table 1: Growth Rate of Oil and Non-Oil Revenues and Exports in Nigeria 


















1971-1975 114.04 23.36 67.96 2.29 737.38 88.74 378.81 6.46
1976-1980 29.58 22.03 29.82 10.21 130.25 105.63 115.65 29.08
1981-1985 -0.11 12.16 -1.4 10.49 27.57 -12.69 5.09 45.01
1986-1990 58.83 48.02 79.95 69.29 786.44 483.96 1174.14 490.4
1991-1995 42.74 58.15 88.82 78.18 292.59 638.9 693.75 393.79
1996-2000 49.76 22.91 23.86 5.48 289.37 173.91 49.35 6.41
2001-2005 30.32 38.89 35.19 52.83 178.9 -13.1 288.09 278.3
2006-2010 11.94 23.54 11.34 55.27 2.05 181.55 57.15 432.21
2011-2014* 9.89 14.69 9.96 3.05 25.9 71.69 6.25 4.38
*four years period  
The historical growth rate of oil revenues is astronomical over the years, starting with 114 
percent annual average between 1971 and 1975 as presented in table 1. It reduced to annual 
average of about 30 percent over the following five years till 1980. The average growth rate was 
negative between 1981 and 1985 which was the period of global crash in the prices of primary 
products. it later picked up at an average growth of 58.83 percent till 1990. However, from 1996, 
the average annual growth rate declines progressively till date, settling at average annual growth 
rate of 9.89 percent between 2011 and 2014. Five-year growth rate of oil revenue was 
unprecedented between 1971 to 1975 with 737 percent increase, it reached climax between 1986 
to 1990 with 786 percent increase. The five-year growth was lowest between 2006 and 2010 with 
2 percent increase, settles at 25 percent between 2011 and 2014. Oil exports maintain relatively 
identical growth pattern, but grew far higher between 1986 and 1990 with 1174 percent and 
693.75 percent between 1991 and 1995, but later suffered set back like oil revenue with five-year 
growth of just 6.25 percent between 2011 and 2014.  
 
Non-oil revenue’s five-year annual average growth was 23.36 percent between 1971-1975, it 
reduced gradually till1985 when it was 12.16 percent, later rose to 58.15 percent between 1991 
and 1995, it then staggered around 22.91 percent in 2000, 38.89 percent in 2005 and fell 
gradually to 14.69 percent between 2011 and 2014. Five-year growth rate of non-oil revenue was 
181 percent between 2006 and 2010, but declined to 71.69 percent. The non-oil export growth 
was relatively low over the period of 1971 till 1985 with the highest five-year average growth of 
10.49. Thereafter, it garnered momentum with annual growth of 69.29 between 1986 and 1990 
and 78.18 percent between 1991 and 1995, it fell sharply between 1996 and 2000 to 5.48 percent, 
but rose sharply to 52.83 and 55.27 in 2005 and 2010 respectively before it reduced to 15.92 
percent between 2011 and 2014. 
 
It is obvious, government efforts could only be fostered if a blue print on the require growth rate 
of the key variables are known, so as to enhance its decisions on the level of efforts and 
commitments expected before attaining any specified revenue and income target. More also the 
income targets should be time bound under various realistic scenarios. These are the key insights 
this paper attempt to provide. 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. While Section 2 reviews the literature, 
section 3 spells out the methodology to be adopted in this study.  Section 4 estimates the model. 
Section 5 gives policy implications. The last section concludes.  
 
2.0 Literature Reviews 
Awe and Ajayi (2009) examined the effects of non-oil revenues on economic development in 
Nigeria and found significant long run relationships between agricultural activities and solid 
minerals on one hand and economic development on the other hand, thus suggest intensifying 
efforts towards expanded utilization of agricultural sector as a development drive. This is not far 
from the submission of Albassam (2015) in his studies of economic diversifications of Saudi 
Arabia, he argued that, economic diversification is fundamental to building sustainable economic 
growth, noting that any economy that is highly dependent on income from a natural resource is 
in danger of instability or even collapse if the price of such commodity decreases in the global 
market, the fundamental crises many oil dependent countries face in the recent time. The study 
however concluded that despite four decades of attempt by Saudi Arabia to diversify the 
economy, it remains heavily dependent on oil revenues. The same is confirmed in a related study 
by Devaux (2013) when he examined the member countries of Gulf Cooperation council (GCC) 
in which is confirmed that, all efforts towards economic diversifications from oil in GCC are not 
yielding significantly. 
 
It is discovered that, economic diversification is not an option but a necessity for oil rich 
economies considering the widely circulated assumptions on the attributes of oil rich countries. 
Karl (2004) argued that countries dependent on oil as their major resource for development are 
characterized by corruption and exceptionally poor governance, a culture of rent seeking, often 
devastating economic, health, and environmental consequences at the local level, and high 
incidences of conflict and war. He further argued that, countries that depend on oil for their 
livelihood eventually become among the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and 
the most conflict-ridden in the world. 
In support of Karl (2007), various studies appear to have substantiated the claims. Lopez-
Murphy and Villafuerte (2010) analysed the average fiscal policy responses of oil producing 
countries (OPCs) to oil price cycle and found that OPCs worsened their non-oil primary balances 
substantially during the period of their studies. The countries were found to engage in increased 
primary spending. However, it was found that the trend was partially reversed when oil prices 
went down in 2009. They further argued that fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical and thus, 
exacerbated the fluctuations in economic activity. It was concluded that a small reduction in oil 
prices could lead to very large financing needs thereafter. Meanwhile, in an earlier studies, 
Barnnet and Ossowski (2002) argued that oil producing countries usually face challenges arising 
from the fact that, oil revenues are volatile and uncertain, as such suggested that non-oil balances 
should feature prominently in the formulation of fiscal policies, such that the gradual adjustment 
in line with non-oil balances would allow for accumulation of substantial financial assets over 
the periods of oil production and where necessary strategies should aim at breaking procyclical 
fiscal responses to volatile oil prices.  
In examining the roles of institutions in the poor performance of oil revenues in the oil rich 
countries, Mehlum Moene and Torvik (2006) established that countries rich in natural resources 
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constitute both growth losers and growth winners, claim that the main reason for the diverging 
experiences is differences in the quality of institutions. It was concluded that more natural 
resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly, while more 
resources raise income, when institutions are producer friendly. Meanwhile, in order to move the 
frontier of roles of institutions forward in oil revenue management, Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth 
(2003) classified oil producing countries under various institutional settings and argued that 
mature democracies clearly have some advantages in managing oil revenues for the long term 
because of their ability to reach consensus, their educated and informed electorates, and a level 
of transparency that facilitates clear decisions on how to use the money earned over a long 
horizon. However, it was noted that even in those systems with institutions that were shaped well 
before oil revenues became large, cautious expenditure management has been a continuing 
struggle. It is therefore not surprising when Ross (2003) concluded that poor political institutions 
constitute the poor performances of oil rich Nigerian economy. 
It is however interesting to realise that studies have shown that non-oil exports are responsible 
for industrial growth in Nigeria and not oil exports.  Riman, Akpan, Offiong and Ojong (2013) 
examined the nexus between oil revenue, non-oil export and industrial output in 
Nigeria using vector autoregressive model. Their long run results show that oil revenue shocks 
and policy and regime shifts had negative impacts on industrial outputs and non-oil exports. The 
impulse response functions and variance decomposition analyses suggest that the major drivers 
of industrial development in Nigeria are non-oil exports and regime shifts.  
Unfortunately, the non-oil export is shallow as argued in various studies. Okoh (2004) employed 
the vector error correction model in a bid to delineate the long run relationship between growth 
in nonoil exports, growth in import of capital inputs and global integration, which was proxied 
by the index of openness. The study showed that global integration though positive was not 
significant in explaining the behaviour of non-oil exports in the long run as well as in the short 
run. However, it was discovered that growth in import of capital inputs positively impacts on the 
growth of non-oil exports. It thus implies that the non-oil export of Nigeria is shallow and non-
significant in the world trade. More also, Adenugba and Dipo (2013) in another study examines 
the performance of non-oil exports in Nigeria as well as the reason for existing pattern and level 
of performances using the operations of Nigeria’s export promotion strategies to assess its 
effectiveness in diversifying the productive base of Nigeria from crude oil. The study reveals that 
non-oil exports performed below expectations, as such the economy is far from diversifying from 
crude oil export consequently, crude oil continues to be the single most important base of the 
economy. 
In most instances when attempts are made to attract investment into the non-oil promotions, the 
impacts are usually not felt due to diversion to the volatile oil sector. This is evidenced in 
Olayiwola and Okodua (2013) who examines the contributions of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) to the performances of nonoil exports in Nigeria within the framework of the export-led 
growth hypothesis. It is evidenced that the bulk of FDI inflow into the country goes to the oil 
sector of the economy which further confirms shallow non-oil export base in the country. 
 
 




3.1 Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) Mode 
ARIMA is a single variable forecast model, but is highly sophisticated for the study such as the 
one under the study. It incorporates the historic characteristic of the data over a long period to 
predict the future values for the variable. 
 
The forecasting tools that came to existence through the publication of Box and Jenkins (1978) 
are known as ARIMA. It suggests the analysis of the probabilistic or stochastic features of time 
series data independent of constructing single or simultaneous equation model. Through the use 
of ARIMA’s model, each variable is able to be explained through its past or lagged values and 
resulting stochastic error term.  
 
The model is an improvement on the Autoregressive Moving Average Model (ARMA) by 
allowing the incorporation of the differencing to allow Stationary of data before the application 
of the ARMA technique. The ARMA (p, q) could be specified as 
  
…………(1) 
In its procedure, if we have to difference a time series data d times to make it Stationary and then 
apply the ARMA (p, q) model to it, the data is then a series of ARIMA (p, d, q). Specific with 
the use of ARIMA model is that the time series must be Stationary or Stationary at one or more 
difference. 
 
Four steps are involved in the use of ARIMA model; identification, estimation diagnostic 
checking and forecasting. The identification involves the determination of the model 
specification parameters which are p, d and q. Autocorrelation function (ACF) and the Partial 
Autocorrelation function (PACF) are the principal tool in the identification process. The result of 
ACF and PACF are plotted against its lag length on correlogram for the identification.  
 
ACF is defined as ratio of covariance at lag (say lag k) and the variance which could be denoted 
as  , ’s value lies between -1 and +1 and has no unit attached because the covariance 
and variance, that is, the numerator and denominator are in the same units. The PACF on the 
other hand is defined as a measure of correlation between observations that are k time periods 
apart, when the correlation at the intermediate lags are controlled for. in other words, the 
influence of intervening variables is removed. The PAC is the correlation between Yt and Yt-k, 
after removing the effect of intermediate Y’s. 
 
Formal unit root test or visual observation of correlogram assist to detect if the data is stationary 
or not, if it is not stationary, the data is difference till the non-stationary disappears. Depending 
on the number of difference to achieve stationary, the value of p, d, q are then determined for the 
ARIMA model estimation. The estimated value is subjected to diagnostic check. The data fitness 
is achieved by collecting the residual of the estimation to verify whether the AC or PAC of 
residuals is statistically significant. If they are not significant, it can then be concluded that the 
residuals are purely random, supporting the fact that the ARIMA estimated is a correct fit for the 
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data. Otherwise, a more appropriate ARIMA specification is sought. Forecasting is conducted 
based on the fitted model.  
 
3.2 Data 
Annual time series data on Oil Revenue (OR), Oil Exports (OEX), Nonoil Revenue (NOR) and 
Non-Oil Exports (NOEX) at current prices, over the period from 1970 to 2014 were collected 
from Central Bank of Nigeria’s Statistical Bulletin, Volume 25, published in 2015.  
 
3.3 The Specification 
First step in ARIMA analysis is to identify specification, that is, ARIMA (p,d,q).  p is the highest 
lag supported by AR term after the data has been de-trending, d is the level of differencing to 
remove the data trending, in order word the times of differencing to ensure data stationarity 
while q is the identified moving average.  the correlogram of non-oil revenue (NOR) and non-oil 
Exports (NOEX) up to 16 lags presented in figure 3a and 3b ensure stationarity at second and 
first difference respectively. The stationarity is further ascertained through a formal Philip-Perror 
unit root test. It is observed through the figure that ACF and PACF at lag 1, 2, 3 and 5 are 
significant, while they are not jointly significant at any other lag value. Through PACF and ACF, 
it could be said that the process that generate the second difference non-oil revenue is at most 5, 
that is Autoregressive AR (5), thus the AR term at lag 1, 2, 3 and 5 shall be included in the 
model. The PACF and ACF for non-oil export (NOEX) are significant at 2, 3, 4, and 5, it could 
be said that the process that generate the first difference non-oil exports is at most 5, that is AR 
(5). To conclude step one of ARIMA modeling process, it is summarized that NOR series is 
ARIMA (5,2,0) and NOEX series is ARIMA (5, 1, 0). 
Figure 3a: Correlogram of Non-Oil Revenue
Date: 11/04/16   Time: 10:01
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 43
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob
1 -0.69... -0.69... 22.386 0.000
2 0.307 -0.34... 26.827 0.000
3 -0.24... -0.45... 29.828 0.000
4 0.363 0.034 36.363 0.000
5 -0.47... -0.33... 48.043 0.000
6 0.453 -0.12... 58.762 0.000
7 -0.27... 0.025 62.764 0.000
8 0.139 -0.04... 63.838 0.000
9 -0.09... 0.193 64.317 0.000
1... 0.038 -0.16... 64.401 0.000
1... -0.01... 0.021 64.419 0.000
1... 0.042 0.018 64.532 0.000
1... -0.03... -0.00... 64.596 0.000
1... 0.004 0.120 64.597 0.000
1... 0.006 -0.09... 64.599 0.000
1... -0.01... 0.092 64.609 0.000
1... 0.011 0.005 64.618 0.000
1... -0.00... -0.00... 64.619 0.000
1... -0.00... 0.031 64.619 0.000
2... 0.002 -0.10... 64.620 0.000
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Figure 3b: Correlogram of Non-Oil Exports
Date: 11/07/16   Time: 17:36
Sample: 1970 2014
Included observations: 44
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Stat  Prob
1 -0.11... -0.11... 0.6489... 0.420...
2 0.368... 0.359... 7.1841... 0.027...
3 0.264... 0.389... 10.631... 0.013...
4 -0.16... -0.27... 11.927... 0.017...
5 0.285... -0.02... 16.147... 0.006...
6 -0.11... 0.013... 16.834... 0.009...
7 -0.02... -0.06... 16.876... 0.018...
8 0.003... -0.13... 16.876... 0.031...
9 0.034... 0.264... 16.945... 0.049...
1... -0.03... 0.046... 17.004... 0.074...
1... 0.035... -0.13... 17.080... 0.105...
1... -0.07... -0.17... 17.398... 0.135...
1... 0.009... 0.133... 17.404... 0.181...
1... -0.03... -0.04... 17.508... 0.230...
1... 0.001... 0.014... 17.508... 0.289...
1... -0.01... 0.043... 17.523... 0.352...
1... -0.03... 0.052... 17.608... 0.413...
1... -0.01... -0.20... 17.627... 0.480...
1... -0.04... -0.04... 17.780... 0.537...
2... -0.03... 0.043... 17.862... 0.596...
 
4.0 The Estimation 
The second step in ARIMA process is estimation. Second difference and first difference data of 
non-oil revenue and non-oil exports data are estimated. If D2NOR represent second difference of 
NOR, while DNOEX represents first difference of NOEX. The models are specified as follows 
respectively; 
 
   (2a) 
  (2b) 
Estimating parameters in eq. 2a and 2b through OLS produces eq.3a and 3b as follows;  
(3a) 
(3b) 
 Eq. 3a and 3b are the models that forecast second difference and first difference data of non-oil 
revenue and non-oil export data respectively. 
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4.1 The Diagnostic Checking 
To perform diagnostic test, residuals are obtained from eq. 3a and 3b using correlogram to 
determine the fitness of the data, the ACF and PACF outputs are not individually statistically 
significane which means, the correlogram of both AC and PAC affirm the residuals from 
regression eq.3a and 3b are pure random noise, thus, the ARIMA models estimated are adequate. 
 
4.2 The Forecasting Model 
The final stage is forecasting. The process requires integrating the second and first difference 
equations to obtain the substantive equations of NOR and NOEX respectively. This produces; 
 
   (4a) 
   (4b) 
4.3 The Model Validation 
The models in eq. (4) are validated for accuracy using the most recent original observed values. 
Five-year data range from 2010 to 2014 are used. As presented in table 2, the average percentage 
deviation between the forecast and actual values is 4.57% and 6.02% for non-oil revenue and 
non-oil export respectively. 
 












2010 1825.43 1907.58 82.15 4.31
2011 2332.45 2237.88 94.57 4.23
2012 2352.34 2628.78 276.44 10.52
2013 3046.97 2950.56 96.41 3.27
2014 3257.4 3275.12 17.72 0.54
Non-Oil Export
2010 713.5 711 2.5 0.35
2011 796.27 913.5 117.23 12.83
2012 858.86 879.3 20.44 2.32
2013 1157.27 1130.2 27.07 2.4
2014 1069.88 953.5 116.38 12.21  
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4.4 The Variable Forecast 
The models forecast is conducted to ensure the number of years require for the non-oil income 
(revenues and exports) to attain the current size of oil income (oil revenues and oil exports). 
Table 3 presents non-oil revenue forecast under various scenario.  
Table 3: Forecast of Non-Oil Revenues* 
Percentage Increases
Scenario 1 Scenario 2









2014 3,275.12 3,275.12 3,275.12
2015 3,662.65 3,602.63 3,766.39
2016 4,026.71 3,962.90 4,331.35
2017 4,387.48 4,359.19 4,981.05
2018 4,785.45 4,795.10 5,728.21
2019 5,185.62 5,274.61 6,587.44
2020 5,576.66 5,802.08 7,575.55
2021 5,994.47 6,382.28 8,711.88







* The forecast aims at identifying number of years required under various scenario to attain the value of Oil Revenue in 
2014 and the higest value in Nigeria history which are, 6,793.72 Billion Naira and 8,878.97 Billion Naira in 2011 
respectively  
Table 3 shows that government will generate in 2023, the non-oil revenues equivalent to oil 
revenues size in 2014, if the historical trend is maintained, and will generate the amount 
equivalent to the highest oil revenues ever, which is 8,878.97 billion Naira by 2028. However, a 
consistent annual increase of 10 percent using 2014 as a base year would reduce the duration to 
2022 and 2025 respectively. The period could be fast track if government’s pace of revenue 
mobilization in the past five years is maintained, which is average of 14.69 percent annually 
between 2010 and 2014. As estimated, the 15 percent annual increase in the non-oil revenue 
mobilization will reduce the duration to 2020 and 2022 respectively and this could be achieved 
given the current government aggressive revenue mobilization from non-oil sources. 
It is not out of content to recount the efforts of internal revenue mobilization agency who has 
been maintaining unprecedented increase in the non-oil revenue generation in the recent time. 
Recently, the chairman of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), Babatunde Fowler argued 
African Journal of Economic Review, Volume VII, Issue I, January 2019 
200 
 
that 70 percent of the revenue shared among the three tiers of government in a month accrued 
from non-oil revenue sources. In his statement;  
“it was the first time in 2016 that the federal government shared over 500 billion naira among the 
three tiers of government during the federal account allocation committee meeting. Of the sum, 
70 percent came from non-oil sources, while only 30 percent came from oil sources. We are 
proud of the development and we tell ourselves that this is the time to fund the budget of the 
federal government from non-oil sources” Gazell News (2016) 
The oil shocks on government revenues are likely to be short lived, and thereafter leave behind a 
strong, formidable and dependable income sources that could be insulated against the volatility 
that are associated with the oil revenue sources. However, a major limitation is that, most of the 
non-oil revenues currently being mobilized are domestic taxes and less are from non-oil exports. 
The implication is the persistent in the shortage of foreign exchange which could still aggravate 
free fall in the value of domestic currency (Naira).  
The story is different when the forecast trends of non-oil exports are examined. Table 4 shows 
much longer periods than it appeared under the non-oil revenues of government.  
Table 4: Forecast of Non-Oil Export* 
Percentage Increases
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4












2014 953.50 953.50 953.50 953.50 953.50
2015 1,015.75 1,048.85 1,106.06 1,125.13 1,191.88
2016 1,068.88 1,153.74 1,283.03 1,327.65 1,489.84
2017 897.28 1,269.11 1,488.31 1,566.63 1,862.31
2018 1,107.29 1,396.02 1,726.45 1,848.63 2,327.88
2019 971.07 1,535.62 2,002.68 2,181.38 2,909.85
2020 1,020.89 1,689.18 2,323.10 2,574.03 3,637.31
2021 1,139.18 1,858.10 2,694.80 3,037.35 4,546.64
2022 977.33 2,043.91 3,125.97 3,584.07 5,683.30
2023 1,191.09 2,248.30 3,626.12 4,229.21 7,104.13
2024 1,099.10 2,473.13 4,206.30 4,990.46 8,880.16
2025 1,114.60 2,720.45 4,879.31 5,888.75 11,100.20
2026 1,265.42 2,992.49 5,660.00 6,948.72 13,875.25
2027 1,099.23 3,291.74 6,565.60 8,199.49
2028 1,294.04 3,620.92 7,616.10 9,675.40
2029 1,239.01 3,983.01 8,834.67 11,416.97
2030 1,216.98 4,381.31 10,248.22 13,472.02




* The forecast aims at identifying number of years required under various scenario to attain the value of Oil Export in 2014 and the higest value in Nigeria 
history which are, 12,007 Billion Naira and 14,323 Billion Naira in 2011 respectively  
As presented in table 4, it would take 466 years and 565 years for non-oil export values to equate 
the size of oil export values in 2014 and the historic highest oil export income in 2011 
respectively. The long periods suggest two key attributes of the non-oil export activities. First, 
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the annual growth rate is low thus, retarding the pace of the forecast. For instance, non-oil 
exports income only increase by 4.38 percent in four years between 2011 and 2014. Secondly, 
the gap between the value of oil exports and non-oil exports is too wide, preventing ease of 
convergence. In 2014, non-oil export was 7.94 percent of oil exports, that is oil exports and non-
oil exports values were 12,007 billion naira and 953.5 billion naira respectively. The non-oil 
export potential in the country is yet to be harnessed, it remains shallow and neglected. 
Adenugba and Dipo (2013) identified ineffective operations of Nigerian export promotion 
council (NEPC) as the key reason for the poor performance of non-oil exports.  However, current 
economic recession is changing the course of export policies towards non-oil export promotions, 
as such, government attention is on the operations of all stakeholders in the non-oil sectors of the 
economy including the NEPC. The government efforts are yielding positively and are expected 
to yield more in the coming years. Thus, the forecast analysis is further projected under various 
scenarios.  
An annual increase of 10 percent using 2014 as a base year would reduce the duration to 2042 
and the period could be shortened to 2032 if the export promotional drive is enhanced to allow 
16 percent annual increase. Meanwhile, 18 percent annual increase will further shorten the 
period to 2030, while 24 percent would make 2026 a real deal. The long run effects of promoting 
non-oil exports over the oil-exports may have higher multiplier effects. For instance, Abogan, 
Akinola and Baruwa (2014) provide evidences to justify the effectiveness of non-oil exports on 
the economy over the income through the oil exports. 
 
5.0 Policy Implications 
Oil income is dominant in Nigeria and obviously it has gained ground and serves as a monolithic 
means of revenue to the government and the main source of foreign exchange to the country. 
While there are evidences to support increasing government non-oil revenues, the income 
through non-oil exports still lag far behind. The current government non-oil revenue 
mobilization trend is promising, with high possibility of overtaking oil revenues within a few 
years. Currently, much of the federal revenues accrue through mobilization efforts of the federal 
inland revenue service in the non-oil sector, it is therefore, not surprising when the minister of 
finance acknowledged that about 70 percent of the monthly income shared by the federal account 
allocation committee in the recent months are through non-oil revenues. If the current pace is 
maintained, there is light at the end of tunnel for Nigerian government revenues.  
   
However, unlike government revenues, the non-oil export requires strategic repositioning of the 
sector. At present, the gap between the oil exports and non-oil exports is too wide, staggering 
between 5 and 10 percent of total exports, while oil exports provide more than 90 percent of total 
exports of the country. Meanwhile, given the dwindle revenues, orchestrated by global crude oil 
price crash, the country is involving concerted efforts to diversify the economic base using non-
oil export as strategy. To achieve this, Nigerian export promotion council developed road map 
for improving Nigeria’s export trade, which is contained in the action plan for accelerated 
implementation of the Nigerian national export strategy document to map out the strategic 
milestone for the operation of the council.  
One of the strategies is to diversify export base from raw materials to value added, thus be able 
to achieve $706m non-oil exports to the West African sub-region by 2017 and increase non-oil 
exports to ECOWAS from 9 per cent in 2014 to 20 per cent in 2017. Another target is to increase 
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non-oil export as percentage of total export from 5 per cent to 20 per cent by 2018; and also 
increase the participation of the small and medium enterprises in export trade by 50 per cent by 
2020. 
The proposed strategy is to building capacity for the micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs) through the government sponsored trainings, to instill international best practice in 
exportation. The joint efforts of all relevant agencies, ministries and parastatals are to be 
harnessed and provide common facilities for clusters of the MSMEs in terms of infrastructure, 
equipment for processing and packaging and transportation with conditioning facilities. The 
availability of the facilities is expected to reduce production cost to the minimum, thus allowing 
the locally made products to thrive in the international markets. Another critical strategy is the 
acquisition of indigenous shipping line to facilitate ease of trading within the African countries 
which is planned to be the immediate target of bulk of export promotion of Nigeria non-oil 
products.  
NEPC identified key products to use as building blocks to the consolidation of its plan towards 
economic diversification, and also highlighted key countries and forecast the income expected to 
accrue as the proposed activities garners momentum. In a statement, the head of NEPC, 
explained;  
 “NEPC identifies strategic products, sectors and 21 countries for Nigerian goods, to 
grow non-oil foreign exchange from $2.7bn today to $30bn. We have set clear output 
targets for products in agriculture, manufacturing, solid minerals and create clear 
mechanisms to get these non-oil products to our ports and into foreign markets”. The 
Punch (2016) 
The adequacy of the strategies and possibility of achieving the target is not in doubt, given high 
potentials of non-oil sector in agriculture and solid minerals. Agricultural products contribute 
about 39 % of total non-oil exports, while the semi-manufactured goods that are essentially 
value-added products from agricultural produce, such as leather and processed skin, cocoa 
products and others also accounts for 31%. It is noted that, the increased non-oil revenues of 
government will have little impact on the economic revitalization if it is not augmented by 
effective diversification of non-oil exports. The current economic recession is aggravated by the 
shortage in the foreign exchange to meet the ever increasing desires of the country for imported 
goods. The locally mobilized revenue for the government without adequate import substitutions 
would prolonged the effects of the recession through naira free fall in the foreign exchange 
market and persistent inflation.  
By implication, the promotion of value chain in the agricultural sector, SME and cottage 
industries, would provide import substitutions, thus relief pressure on the domestic currency at 
the foreign exchange market and also generate foreign exchange for the economy through export 
promotions. In a nutshell, the roles of non-oil export promotion through effective non-oil sector 
revitalization is fundamental to the ability of Nigeria to exit current economic recession, more 








The study examines the possibilities of non-oil incomes (though export and government 
revenues) in Nigeria overtaking the oil incomes using Autoregressive Integrated Moving 
Average (ARIMA) model. The result shows that it is easier for federal government’s non-oil 
revenues to rise above the oil revenues than non-oil exports to rise above the oil exports. 
Specifically, the non-oil revenue is expected to hit the 2014’s oil revenue of government in 9 
years by 2023, while it would take non-oil export 466 years to generate the 2014’s equivalent 
income of oil exports. The study also identified the highest oil revenue (government expenditure 
and oil exports) in history and project non-oil income to identify the number of years to hit the 
records. While it will take government revenues 12 years to attain the historic highest revenue 
from oil, non-oil export will achieve it in 565 years as suggested by ARIMA forecast. However, 
the periods could be shortened depending on the nation’s commitment to the ongoing 
diversification efforts.    
 
However, the study acknowledges the ongoing efforts of government on non-oil revenue 
mobilization which is yielding positive results, such that most of the recent government revenues 
are dominated by non-oil sources. The study, therefore recommends that the tempo should be 
maintained and where possible it should be further enhanced. However, it is argued that 
government non-oil revenue mobilization is not a standalone hypothesis to scale the economy 
through the current recession, instead, non-oil exports have critical roles to play in dowsing the 
current pressure on the Nigeria foreign exchange. It is identified that, non-oil export promotion 
would not only increase income to the country, but provide additional foreign exchange and also 
create effective domestic substitutions for imported goods, which would relieve pressure on the 
domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. Consequently, the foreign exchange 
motivated inflation would be easier to manage. As it stands, the percentage of non-oil exports to 
total export is below 8 percent, while non-oil revenue to total government revenues staggered 
around 33 per cent in 2014.    
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